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Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall.
Humpty Dumpty had a greatfall.
All the king's horses and all the king's men,
couldn Yput Humpty together again.
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Like Humpty Dumpty, a family, once broken by divorce, cannot
be put back together in precisely the same way."' There is a different
family, a custodial family, consisting of the marital children and
whichever parent the courts (or the couple) thought would be more
suitable for the role of custodial parent.2 This Note deals with the legal
problems that arise when one parent wishes to relocate to a new
geographical area with the child. The parent may want to accompany a
new spouse to her new residence, seek out employment opportunities, or
simply sever all ties to the marital home and begin again in a different
area. Regardless of the reason, however, the conflict is the same: the
noncustodial parent faces an impairment of her visitation rights because
the custodial parent seeks to relocate (or has already relocated) their
children to an area farther away from the noncustodial parent. Problems
arise when courts try to channel the direction of the new post-divorce
family so that it mimics the pre-divorce family.
In theory, there are three approaches to resolving a relocation
problem: the court will either favor the custodian, favor the noncustodian,
or advocate a "neutral" approach whereby, in theory, neither parent is
favored. A state will adhere to one of these general approaches by means
of either a presumption or through an allocation of the burden of proof.
The laws of some states contain outright presumptions that clearly favor
either the custodial or the noncustodial parent. Other states create
presumptions through the interpretation of laws and precedents. Similarly,
the burden of proof can be directly or indirectly allocated to favor either

1. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996).
2. Severaljurisdictions have recognized the difference between pre- and post-divorce families.
See, e.g., D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.Div.), aff d, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
The children, after the parents' divorce or separation, belong to a different family
unit than they did when the parents lived together. The new family unit consists only
of the children and the custodial parent, and what is advantageous to that unit as a
whole, to each of its members individually and to the way they relate to each other
and function together is obviously in the best interests of the children.
Id. at 29-30.
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the custodial or noncustodial parent. The result can be either a light
burden on the favored parent (indirectly placing the real burden of proof
on the adverse party), or a burden that directly falls on the unfavored
parent.
The "neutral" approach to resolving relocation problems, in theory,
requires a court only to consider the welfare of the child involved. As a
matter of policy, all courts hearing custody disputes look to the child's
best interests, and some even make claims of neutrality.3 However, the
child's interests do not exist in a vacuum, but rather, are naturally
interwoven with the interests of both parents. Thus, in actuality, one
parent will be favored under the guise of the best interests of the child.4
It is this elusive neutral category that seems to be the goal of New
York relocation law. In March 1996, New York's highest court changed
New York's relocation standard from one that what was perceived to be
one of the most restrictive relocation standards, to a more permissive
approach. Prior to the 1996 Tropea v. Tropea5 decision, New York
courts analyzed relocation problems under a three-tier test. First, a
noncustodial parent had to show that the move would affect her access
to the child. If such a showing was made, the custodial parent had to
demonstrate both that exceptional circumstances justified infringing upon
visitation, and farther, that the move was in the best interests of the
child.6
In Tropea, the court adopted the "best interests of the child"
standard in an attempt to fix the problems that existed under the threetier approach. As discussed below, these problems included (1) lack of
judicial insight as to how this standard would be interpreted, (2) an
increase in the number of cases litigated, and (3) an improper allocation
of the burden of proof on the custodial parent wishing to relocate.7
However, the best interests of the child standard not only failed to fix
these existing problems, but generated new ones as well. The best
interests of the child standard, as applied to relocation law, has and will
continue to fail in remedying the complexity of relocation problems.

3. See Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Custodial
Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 293 (1996) (noting that Maryland
courts have classified the new relocation statute as neutral, even though, in truth, it favors the
noncustodial parent).
4. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathiing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in a
Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791, 803 (1992-1993).
5. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
6. See infira notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part IV.
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This Note will argue that when faced with a relocation problem,
instead of the best interests of the child standard, the court should
presume that the custodial parent has a right to relocate upon showing a
good faith reason for the move. The noncustodial parent could rebut this
presumption by demonstrating that the move would harm the child.8 This
presumption reflects a policy that protects the new post-divorce family.
Moreover, it recognizes that the custodial parent should not be forced to
relitigate the issue of custody that was originally awarded under the best
interests analysis.
Part II of this Note surveys the various state approaches to
relocation law. Part IR analyzes the development and application of the
three-tier test in pre-Tropea case law and concludes with a discussion of
the New York court's Tropea decision. Part IV focuses on the problems
which existed under the three-tier standard and, further, how the decision
in Tropea has not only failed to resolve these problems but also creates
additional ones. The Note concludes that the best solution to relocation
problems is a presumption that the custodial parent has the right to
relocate with her children.
II.

APPROACHES TO RELOCATION LAW

There are currently three general approaches to relocation law.' A
court will either favor the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, or
advocate a neutral approach whereby the court considers only the best
interests of the child. While the courts of virtually every state claim to
focus upon the interests of the child, in practice, the application of their
statutes and case law clearly demonstrate that each state's approach really
favors one parent over the other.'

8. Because a move will almost always affect the noncustodial parent's visitation schedule,
and because the maintenance of a meaningful parent-child relationship can be accomplished through
alternate visitation schedules, a showing of harm would require more than a mere effect upon the
noncustodial parent's access to the child.
9. See James Grayson, International Relocation, the Right to Travel, and the Hague
Convention: Additional Requirements for Custodial Parents,28 FAM. L.Q. 531, 532 (1994). The
American Law Institute divided the jurisdictions into "states [which] place a heavy burden on the
relocating party to establish the benefits of the move to the child... [and] states [which] apply a
strong presumption in favor of relocation." Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis
and Recommendations § 2.20, Reporter's Notes, cmt. d (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1996); see also
Bowermaster, supra note 4, at 803 (stating that the real decision in relocation is a policy
determination of whether to favor the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent).
10. See Bowermaster, supra note 4, at 799 (stating that the ability of the best interests of the
child standard to resolve relocation disputes is merely an illusion).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss1/5
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New York, once fitting into the extremely restrictive category, now
purports to look only to the child's interests. However, prior to an
examination of whether New York's attempt to reach this third category
by changing its standard is actually biased towards one parent, it is
necessary to examine the various other approaches to relocation disputes.
A. JurisdictionsFavoringthe CustodialParent
There are two primary ways in which the courts and legislatures
have favored a custodial parent in relocation disputes. The first has been
an outward bias in the form of a presumption, and the second has been
a favorable allocation of the burden of proof.
1. Presumptions Favoring Relocation
Jurisdictions which favor the custodial parent through an explicit
presumption allowing relocation provide the custodial parent with the
greatest security in being able to move and still retain custody of her
children. For example, a custodial parent in Wisconsin who decides to
relocate with her children is backed by a statutory presumption in favor
of that parent's right to move." The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
showed the strength of this presumption in Kerkvliet v. Kerkvliet 2
There, even though the custodial mother's motive for moving with the
children was deemed "feeble and insensitive," she was allowed to take
the children to Florida against the wishes of the noncustodial parent. 3
The Wisconsin court viewed the relocation issue as not whether to
allow the move, but rather whether to transfer custody to the noncustodial parent in the event that the move actually took place. 4 In Kerkvliet,
the court stated that it did not have the power to leave custody with the
custodial parent and then deny that parent's ability to move. 5 Therefore,
under the current statutory structure in Wisconsin, the custodial parent's
ability to move and retain custody of their child is favored because the

11.

The Wisconsin statute provides:
There is a rebuttable presumption that continuing the current allocation of
decision making under a legal custody order or continuing the child's physical placement
with the parent with whom the child resides for the greater period of time is in the best
interest of the child. This presumption may be overcome by a showing that the move or
removal is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the child.

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.327(3)(a)(2)(a) (West Supp. 1996).
12. 480 N.W.2d 823 Ois. Ct. App. 1992).

13. See id. at 829.
14. See id. at 826.
15. See id.
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noncustodial parent can resist the custodial parent's move only by
petitioning for a transfer of custody.
A statutory presumption like that in Wisconsin generally dictates the
outcome of relocation disputes by making it very difficult for the
noncustodial parent to resist the move. The noncustodial parent, forced
to petition for a change in custody, faces a "heavy burden" in overcoming the presumption and in showing that the custody transfer is in the
best interests of the child. 6 The Kerkvliet court took the protection of
the custodial parent even further by emphasizing their ability to interpret
the meaning of "best interests of the child" and to incorporate "numerous
other considerations that are commonly associated with best interest of
7
the child."'
South Dakota also supports a statutory presumption securing the
custodial parent's ability to move and retain custody of her children.
In Fortin v. Fortin,9 the South Dakota Supreme Court faced a relocation request which, if enforced, would have dramatically altered the
visitation schedule of the noncustodial parent. The court held that the
potential changes in visitation should only be considered in the light of
how these changes would affect the new custodial family."0 In Fortin,
the custodial mother wished to relocate with her children to join her
future husband.2 ' The court allowed the move, finding that the mother
was motivated by her desire to be with her new husband rather than a
desire to interfere with visitation.22

16. See id.at 830.
17. Id. at 828. The court, in declining to limit the investigation of the best interests to the
motive and the effect of the move, stated that such a limitation would prevent consideration of the
quality of the child's relationship with the moving parent and the noncustodial parent's ability to
accept the responsibility of primary physical custody if custody is transferred. See id.
18. The South Dakota statute reads as follows: "A parent entitled to the custody of a child has
the right to change his residence, subject to the power of the circuit court to restrain a removal which
would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (Michie 1984).
19. 500 N.W.2d 229 (S.D. 1993).
20. See id. at 232 (citing D'Onofrio v. D'Onofiio, 365 A.2d 27 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.),
aft'd,365 A.2d 716 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)).
21. Seeid.at231.
22. See id. at 233-34 (Miller, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Miller noted that the majority
decision ignored the precedential allocation of the burden of proof to the custodial parent to show
that the move was in the child's best interests, and instead, sought only to protect the newly created
post-dissolution family. See id. ("Clearly, under [the] settled law, the burden is on the custodial
parent ... to show that a proposed move is 'consistent with the best interests of the
child."'(emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981))).
In In reEhlen, 303 N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1981), the South Dakota Supreme Court, in allowing
a custodial parent to move, adhered to "[t]he majority of cases dealing with removal" and stated that
"if a parent who has custody of a child has good reason for living in another state, removal will be

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss1/5
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Similar to Wisconsin, the South Dakota statutory presumption in
favor of the custodial parent and the willingness of the court to ignore
burdens of proof allocated to the custodial parent leave the noncustodial
parent with only one way to resist the move-petition for custody.
However, in Fossum v. Fossum, the South Dakota presumption again
held strong when faced with a request to change custody. There, the
court held that the removal of a child did not constitute the required
"substantial change in circumstances" necessary to deny the move and
warrant a transfer of custody. 4
Pro-removal jurisdictions often protect the custodial family by
focusing on the continuing stability of the custodial parent's relationship
with the child. Recently, in In re Marriage of Francis,' the Colorado
Supreme Court held that
the child's best interests are served by preserving the custodial relationship, by avoiding relitigation of custody decisions, and by recognizing
the close link between the best interests of the custodial parent and the
best interests of the child. In a removal dispute, this leads logically to
a presumption that the custodial parent's choice to move with the
children should generally be allowed."
The Colorado presumption arises upon a showing that a sensible reason
for the move exists.27 The court emphasized stability in the child's
relationship with the custodial parent and, consequently, protected the
custodial parent by making it more difficult to challenge a relocation.28
The court reasoned that the practical effect of a custody change in a
relocation dispute was a change in residence whether it involved a sole
custody or a joint custody award. 9 Therefore, the court determined that
the standard for relocation cases, where there is any risk of changing the

permitted, providing such a move is consistent with the best interests of the child." Id. at 810.
Therefore, while the burden of proof was technically allocated to the custodial parent, as Chief
Justice Miller noted in his dissent, the majority was willing to find the burden met upon a showing
that a "good reason" to move existed.
23. 545 NAV.2d 828 (S.D. 1996).
24. Id. at 832-33. The court noted that certain changes, e.g., a change in home, a change in
school, or a reduction in contact with family and friends in the area, are all natural consequences of
any move. In addition, the court noted that since the distance of the relocation was small, the impact
of these changes would be minimized. See id
25. 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996) (en banc).
26. Id. at 784.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.at 783.
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residential custody of the child, should be the more stringent endangerment standard, which allows a custody modification only if the move
would somehow harm the child. 0
Even in the absence of explicit statutory presumptions, some courts
interpret their state's relocation statutes in ways that result in presumptions favoring the custodial parent's right to move. For example, in Auge
v. Auge, 31 the Supreme Court of Minnesota adopted a pro-custodial
parent presumption despite a statute which seemingly favors the
noncustodial parent. The Minnesota statute provides:
The custodial parent shall not move the residence of the child to
another state except upon order of the court or with the consent of the
noncustodial parent, when the noncustodial parent has been given
visitation rights by the decree. If the purpose of the move is to interfere
with visitation rights given to the noncustodial parent by the decree, the
court 32shall not permit the child's residence to be moved to another
state.
The court stated in Auge that absent a showing of specific harm to
the child, a petition for removal would not trigger a de novo review of
the already determined issue of custody.33 Thus, although the Minnesota
statute is worded to favor the noncustodial parent, the court's interpretation favors the custodial parent by requiring the noncustodial parent to
meet the difficult burden of showing that the purpose of the move is to
interfere with visitation. By avoiding the relitigation of custody, the court
presumes that the custodial parent has a right to relocate and retain
custody.
While the Minnesota presumption, regarded as one of the most
protective of the custodial parent's relationship," it is vulnerable to a
showing by the noncustodial parent that the move is contrary to the

30. See id. The Colorado court set forth various ways in which the noncustodial parent could

rebut the presumption and overcome the heavy burden of showing that the move would not be in
the best interests of the child. See id. at 784-85. The noncustodial parent could show that the child
was integrated into her family; that the custodial parent consented to a modification of custody; that
the negative impact of the move "cumulatively outweighs the advantages" of remaining with the
custodial parent; or that the move would endanger the child. Id. at 785.
31. 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983).
32. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(3) (West 1990).
33. See Auge, 334 NAV.2d at 399. The court noted that by the time a relocation case reaches
the courthouse, custody was already determined. See id.
34. See Bowermaster, supra note 4, at 828; Mandy S. Cohen, Note, A Toss of the Dice... The
Gamble with Post-DivorceRelocation Laws, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 147 (1989).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss1/5
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child's best interests.35 To meet this burden, courts require more than an
impairment on the noncustodial parent's visitation36 or the child's
preference to remain in the general location where he or she currently
resides.37 InAuge, while not excluding other grounds to deny relocation,
the court noted only one means by which a noncustodial parent could
meet this burden: the noncustodial parent could show that the purpose of
the move is to frustrate the noncustodial parent's visitation rights.38
The Supreme Court of California recently joined the ranks of
presumption jurisdictions when it decided In re Marriage of Burgess.39
The court held that the trial court must take into account the presumption
that the custodial parent has a right to move with her child, provided that
the move "would not be prejudicial to [the child's] rights or welfare. '
The Burgess court provided the custodial parent with greater security in

35. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397. Courts have previously denied moves where the
noncustodial father presented evidence that the stability and security of the custodial mother's new
marriage was questionable; that no social service agency evaluated the child's perspective new home;
that the noncustodial father's visitation would be affected; and that the children's relationship with
both extended families would suffer. See Sydnes v. Sydnes, 388 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(denying a mother's petition to move to France where the noncustodial father presented evidence that
the children had adjusted to their home, school, and community, and that the stability and continuity
of remaining in Minnesota was in the children's best interests); Benson v. Benson, 346 N.W.2d 196,
198-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
36. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 398 (citing D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)); see also Hurt v. Hurt, No.
C6-94-689, 1995 WIL 59501, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1995) (holding that the removal of the
party's five children to Oregon did not merit a denial of the relocation simply because it made
visitation inconvenient and because the appropriate response would be a modification of the
visitation schedule and not a denial of the move).
37. See Knott v. Knott, 418 N.W.2d 505,507 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Madgett v. Madgett, 360
N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the preference of the child is not dispositive,
but may be considered as one factor).
38. See Auge, 334 NAV.2d at 397. In both Benson, 346 N.W.2d at 199, and Sydnes, 388
N.W.2d at 6, the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent were a determining factor in the court's
denial of the custodial parent's petition to remove the children.
In addition to denying relocation because it purposely frustrates the noncustodial parent's
visitation rights, the court has the authority to modify custody or deny a move, upon a showing of
detriment to the child. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d) (West Supp. 1997).
39. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Prior to Burgess, California courts required a custodial parent
seeking to remove a child to show that the move was in the child's best interests. See In re Marriage
of Hoover, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737, 740 (Ct. App. 1995). InIn re Marriageof Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr.
840 (Ct. App. 1991), the California Court of Appeal stated that the "precise test is whether any
rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child."
Id. at 845. Accordingly, California courts often deferred to the trial court's determination of best
interests. See Hoover, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 738; In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 298 (Ct.
App. 1993).
40. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478.
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the original custody award by rejecting the trial court's attempt to apply
a three-tier standard and by removing burdens of proof allocated to the

custodial parent."
Moreover, the court eliminated the previous requirement that the
custodial parent show that a move is "necessary" and relieved trial courts
from having to '"micromanage' family decisionmaking by secondguessing everyday decisions about career and family."'42 Like the
Minnesota court, the California court looked to avoid the relitigation of

custody by concluding that a custody arrangement, once reached, should
not be reexamined in a relocation case. "Instead, [the court] should
preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant change
in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in the

child's best interest."

While it is California's public policy to foster

"frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have
separated or dissolved their marriage," the Burgess court noted that

maintenance of meaningful contact between the noncustodial parent and
the child was "not restricted to any particular formula for contact or

visitation; nor is [the court] required to make a custody determination
that preserves the predissolution status quo."'45
The Burgess court recognized the realistic desire of post-dissolution
families to redirect their growth. "[I]t is unrealistic to assume that
divorced parents will permanently remain in the same location after
dissolution or to exert pressure on them to do so."'

41. The court of appeal applied the following test: First, the noncustodial parent must show
that the move will have an adverse impact on the existing pattern of care and adversely affect the
nature and quality of the noncustodial parent's contact with the child. If there is an impact, the
custodial parent must show that the move is "reasonably necessary." Finally, the third tier requires
the court to balance the benefit to the child in moving against the loss of contact with the
noncustodial parent. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 227-28 (Ct. App. 1995).
42. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481. The court of appeal read into the California Family Code
§ 3020, an implicit requirement that the custodial parent show that the move is necessary. See
Burgess, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228. The Family Code reads as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure minor
children frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have
separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage parents to share the rights and
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy, except where the contact
would not be in the best interest of the child, as provided in Section 3011.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 1994).
43. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 482 (quoting Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986) (in
bank)).
44. Id. at 479 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020).
45. Id. at 481.
46. Id. at 480-81.
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Presumptions generally provide the custodial parent with the greatest
amount of security in being permitted to relocate and still retain custody.
Moreover, presumptions promote stability in the relationship between the
custodial parent and the child by making it more difficult for the
noncustodial parent to challenge a removal petition. In addition,
presumptions enhance custodial family stability by moving certain
decisions, such as where the new custodial family is to reside, outside the
court's authority. The decision to relocate should not trigger a reexamination of the already determined issue of custody. Absent a showing that
a move would harm a child, courts should presume that the custodial
parent has a right to relocate.
2. Burdens of Proof Favoring Relocation
By allocating the burden of proof, a court or legislature can favor
the custodial parent in one of two ways. First, a light burden can fall on
the custodial parent causing a shift in the burden of proof. This shift
indirectly places the heavier burden on the noncustodial parent. Second,
the burden can directly fall upon the noncustodial parent challenging the
move.
Indirect placement of the burden on the noncustodial parent will
sometimes require clarification by the court as the burden is often
worded as though it falls on the custodian. For example, a custodial
parent seeking permission to relocate in Florida faces a six-part test '
and a statutory statement of public policy favoring "frequent and
continuing contact with both parents" after dissolution or separation.4'
The six part test-which includes examining the likelihood of improving
the quality of life, the motives behind the move, the likelihood of
complying with substitute visitation, the adequacy of substitute visitation,
the affordability of the transportation of the child, and the catch all "best
interests of the child"' 4 9 -would seem to work against a custodial parent
by placing numerous obstacles in the way of relocation. However, in a
concurring opinion, Chief Judge Schwartz specifically enunciated the
District Court of Appeal's policy of favoring the custodial parent's right
to relocate and stated that
so long as the parent who has been granted the primary custody of the
child desires to move for a well-intentioned reason and founded belief

47. See Hill v. Hill, 548 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).

48. FLA. STAT. ANN. §61.13(2)(b)(1) OVest Supp. 1997).
49. Hill, 548 So. 2d at 706.
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that the relocation is best for that parent's-and, it follows, the
child's-well-being, rather than from a vindictive desire to interfere
with the visitation rights of the other parent, the change in residence
should ordinarily be approved.5
Subsequent cases have attempted to reconcile this pro-custodial
policy with the Hill test and the statutory statement of policy. The
Florida Supreme Court, in Mize v. Mize," attempted to clarify this issue
by applying the six part test in addition to citing the Hill concurrence.
Further clarification was recently provided in Russenberger v.
Russenberger,52 where the court held that although it did not interpret
Mize as a "per se rule" in favor of the custodial parent, courts should
allow relocation where there is a good faith motive behind the move, and
as per the Hill factors, the child's best interests will be served in the new
location at least as well as in the current location."
Similar to Florida, the New Jersey relocation policy required
clarification in the light of a statute which states that "[children] shall not
be removed out of [their] jurisdiction against their own consent, if of
suitable age ... nor while under that age without the consent of both
parents, unless the court, upon cause shown, shall otherwise order."54 In
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio,55 the court clarified the meaning of "cause" by
creating the "real advantage" test.
Under this test, the custodial parent had to show a "real advantage
to herself and the children" as a result of the move.56 Since D'Onofrio,
the "real advantage" test has been modified to further protect the
custodial parent's right to seek out a better life. 7 In Cooper v. Coo-

50. Id. at 707-08 (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring) (footnotes omitted).
51. 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993). However, the Mize court limited the application of the Hill
test to situations where the final custody determination did not incorporate a prohibition against the
relocation of the child. This would reflect that relocation had already been litigated, and a further
change would require a showing of a change in circumstances by the custodial parent. See id. at 420.
52. 654 So. 2d 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
53. See id. at 214. Commentators have interpreted the strong pro-custodial parent approach to
be a presumption in favor of the right to move. See Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 3, at 275
(stating that in Mize, the Florida court "adopted a presumption that the custodial parent can relocate
outside of the state with the children"). However, given the initial wording of Hill, the statutory
statement of public policy and the need for judicial interpretation of these obstacles, the Florida
approach is more appropriately discussed with other burden of proof jurisdictions.
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 1993).
55. 365 A.2d 27 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
56. Id. at 30.
57. The D'Onofi'o court, in allowing the move, noted that the custodial parent should have
the same right as the noncustodial parent to relocate and to seek out opportunities for a better or
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per,58 the court relaxed the "real advantage" burden to require only a
"good-faith reason for the move."59' This threshold was further relaxed
in Holder v. Polanski, ° where the court held that "any sincere goodfaith reason" would be sufficient provided the move was not "inimical
to the best interests of the children or [did not] adversely affect the
visitation rights of the noncustodial parent."'" Therefore, under New
Jersey law, a custodial parent can now meet their burden of proving
"cause" by showing any valid motive for relocation.
An indirect allocation of the burden of proof is often accomplished
by first requiring the custodial parent to show that there is a good faith
motive behind the move. Meeting this threshold requirement switches the
burden of proof onto the noncustodial parent to show that the move is
not in the child's best interests. For example, the Florida court allocates
the burden of its six part test first to the custodial parent to show a good
faith motive. The burden then switches to the noncustodial parent to
show that the move is against the child's best interests as per the Hill
factors.62
Similarly, Nevada courts allocate a light burden of proof to the
custodial parent in order to switch the true weight of the burden to the
noncustodial parent. For example, in Trent v. Trent,63 the Supreme
Court of Nevada required the custodial parent to show "a sensible, good
faith reason for the move."' Upon meeting this threshold burden, the
court then weighed additional factors including the chance of improving
the child's and parent's quality of life, the motives behind the move,
compliance with a revised visitation schedule, the noncustodial parent's
motives in opposing the move, and the chance that visitation rights could
be realized.6'

different lifestyle. See id.
58. 491 A.2d 606 (NJ. 1984).
59. Id. at 613. The Cooper court justified the allocation of the burden of proof based upon the

noncustodial parent's ability to demonstrate that the alternative visitation schedule would not be
possible. See itaat 614.
60. 544 A.2d 852 (N.J. 1988).
61. Id. at 856 (emphasis added). The Holder court, while specifically stating that the
noncustodial parent's right to visitation should be considered, noted that it may be possible to allow

the move and still honor the visitation schedule. Either way, the concern should be the best interests
of the child. See id.

62. See Russenberger v. Russenberger, 654 So. 2d 207, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
63.

890 P.2d 1309 (Nev. 1995).

64. Id. at 1313 (citing Jones v. Jones, 885 P.2d 563 (Nev. 1994)).
65. See id.The factors examined in Nevada were originally listed in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 812

P.2d 1268, 1271 (Nev. 1991). See also Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d 702, 706 (Nev. 1995); Gandee v.
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The noncustodial parent is then left to establish that an alternative
schedule is not in the best interests of the child.6 In recent years,
Nevada courts have accepted large blocks of summer and vacation time
as acceptable alternatives to the usual weekly visitation schedule. 7 In
this way, the courts are able to balance the child's and the noncustodial
parent's interests while still protecting the custodial parent's right to
continue with her life.
New Jersey's "real advantage" test, a cornerstone of relocation law,
also places the true weight of the burden of proof on the noncustodial
parent. Once the custodial parent meets the threshold of showing "any
good faith reason," the noncustodial parent then must show that the move
is not in the child's best interests or that the move would adversely affect
the noncustodial parent's visitation rights." However, even in the event
that the move would affect visitation, the Holder court stated that "if the
custodial parent is acting in good faith and not to frustrate the noncustodial parent's visitation rights, that should suffice."69 Similar to presumption jurisdictions, such as Minnesota and California," as well as burden
of proof jurisdictions such as Nevada," the Holder court noted that
simply affecting the visitation would be insufficient to challenge
relocation because visitation may be mitigated under an alternative
visitation schedule.72 Finally, the court concluded that the noncustodial
parent must show that the move would somehow harm the child rather
than requiring the custodial parent to show that the move would be a
benefit.73

Gandee, 895 P.2d 1285, 1291 (Nev. 1995) (reversing the denial of a custodial mother's petition to
relocate with her children where the lower court failed to consider alternative visitation schedules).
In addition to the initial light burden on the custodial parent, the Nevada court also uses the
additional factors to protect the custodial parent-child relationship. The court considers the additional

secondary factors by focusing on the feasibility of a reasonable, alternative visitation schedule (a
relatively easy task for the custodial parent wishing to move). See Cook, 898 P.2d at 706; see also
Gandee, 895 P.2d at 1285.

66. See Cook, 898 P.2d at 706.
67. See Jones, 885 P.2d at 570-71 (holidays, one month split throughout the summer, and
three-day weekends); Schwartz, 812 P.2d at 1272 (one summer month).
68. See Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 856 (NJ. 1988).

69. Id. at 857.
70. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.

72. See Holder, 544 A.2d at 857 ("[fln our mobile society, it may be possible to honor that
schedule and still recognize the right of a custodial parent to move."); see also Winer v. Winer, 575
A.2d 518,524,528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (remanding the case to determine if an alternate

visitation schedule would be sufficient to mitigate the loss of the present visitation schedule).
73. See Holder, 544 A.2d at 857.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss1/5

14

Driscoll: In Search of a Standard: Resolving the Relocation Problem in New
1997]

RELOCATON PROBLEM IN NEW YORK

Some jurisdictions will indirectly favor the custodial parent by
taking into consideration not only the child's interests but also the
interests of the custodial parent. For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Holder noted that the custodial parent "should enjoy the same
freedom of movement as the noncustodial parent."'74 Likewise, in
Rampolla v. Rampolla,75 the court recognized that when two parents
agree on location, it is often an agreement to remain in close proximity,
not necessarily to remain in close proximity within a particular jurisdiction.76 The Rampolla court suggested weighing not only the possibility
of the custodial parent remaining where they currently reside, but also the
possibility of the noncustodial parent moving to the custodial parent's
new jurisdiction, thereby indirectly adding once again to the noncustodial
parent's burden of proof.' This approach was a major step toward for
the current trend to award custody to a parent, not a jurisdiction.
The court recognized that the noncustodial parent's relationship with
the child can exist in a new location just as it existed in the former one.
The New Jersey court's approach, equating the ability of the noncustodial
parent to move with the possibility of the custodial parent remaining in
the current jurisdiction, is analogous to the Florida court's requirement
that the custodial parent show that the child's quality of life in the new
location will be at least as good as it is in the current jurisdiction."
Both analyses recognize that the child's best interests are not dependent
upon location, but rather upon the child's relationship with the custodial
parent.
Courts in other jurisdictions, following New Jersey's "real advantage" test, have recognized that the child's interests are interwoven with,
and possibly dependent upon, the interests of the custodial parent. 9 One

74. Id. at 856.
75. 635 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
76. See id.at 544.
77. See id. at 543-44.
78. See Russenberger v. Russenberger 654 So. 2d 207, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
79. See Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985); Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 812 P.2d 1268 (Nev. 1991); Gnuber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990);
Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786,791 (Vt. 1992); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993). Butsee
McQuade v. McQuade, 901 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1995) (declining to adopt the test in D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio,365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), af'd, 365 A.2d 716 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976), so as to avoid a rigid rule governing custody law and stating that removal required a de novo
review of custody); Pollock v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633, 636 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
although the custodial parent should show an advantage to the move, it is only one of several factors
which the court may consider).
The degree to which each of these jurisdictions follows the New Jersey test varies as many
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commentator has referred to this dependency as the "trickle down"

approach to relocation law, whereby the best interests of the child are
protected by considering the interests of the custodial parent." For
example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Gruber v. Gruber,8
established a test similar to New Jersey's "real advantage" test82 and
stated that "the best interests of the child are more closely allied with the
interests and quality of life of the custodial parent and cannot, therefore,
be determined without reference to those interests."83
In jurisdictions where the burden falls directly on the noncustodial
parent, courts and legislatures are generally willing to take a more

aggressive stance in protecting the custodial parent's right to relocate. For
example, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in Swonder v. Swonder,
interpreted the state's relocation statute 5 to reflect the "custodial
parent's right to continued custody." 6 There, the noncustodial father
petitioned the court for a transfer of custody in the event that the
custodial mother moved their children to Colorado.87

of them have not, as of yet, digested the more recent New Jersey interpretations of the D'Onofrio
"real advantage" test. See Staab v. Hurst, 868 S.W.2d 517 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994) (en bane) (adopting
the D'Onofrio factors under the "real advantage test" but not including the subsequent "good faith
reason" modification of the test). In addition, some jurisdictions expanded upon the New Jersey "real
advantage" test by adding additional factors. See e.g., Russenberger,654 So. 2d at 212 n.4 (noting
that the Florida relocation test incorporated the New Jersey factors in addition to other considerations).
80. See Harry J. Gruener, The Custody Relocation Conundrum, FAIRSHARE Oct. 1994, at 16,
18.
81. 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
82. The court set forth the following steps in its relocation analysis:
[A]ssess the potential advantages of the proposed move and the likelihood that the move
would substantially improve the quality of life for the custodial parent and the children
and is not the result of a momentary whim on the part of the custodial parent.
Next, the court must establish the integrity of the motives of both the custodial
and non-custodial parent in either seeking the move or seeking to prevent it.
Finally, the court must consider the availability of realistic, substitute visitation
arrangements which will adequately foster an ongoing relationship between the child and
the non-custodial parent.
Id. at 439.
83. Id. at 438.
84. 642 N.E.2d 1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
85. See ND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21.1 (Vest Supp. 1996).
86. Swonder, 642 N.E.2d at 1380 (emphasis added).
87. See id. at 1376-77. Under Indiana statutory law, upon request of either party involved in
a relocation dispute, the court will examine and, if necessary, modify the custody, visitation, or
support orders. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21. Such a heavy burden is similar to a
presumption, used in states such as Wisconsin, where the noncustodial parent can only resist a move
by showing that it is against the child's best interests. Such resistance must be in the form of a
petition to transfer custody. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
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According to the Indiana Code,8 a noncustodial parent challenging
a relocation by petitioning to modify custody must show that the
modification would be in the child's best interests and that there is a
change in circumstances "so substantial and continuing as to make the
existing custody order unreasonable." 9 Moreover, the change must be
a "change of conditions in the custodial home or a change in the
treatment of the children in the custodial home ... of a decisive,
substantial, and continuing nature."9 The Swonder court protected the
custodial parent by holding that an out of state move is not so substantial
and continuing to justify a denial of the move. In further support of
the custodial parent, the court stated that relocation is just another change
that "occur[s] as life goes on" and is not a reason to relitigate custody.92
Similar to the Indiana court's protection of the custodial parent by
making it very difficult for the noncustodial parent to contest the move,
North Dakota courts favor the custodial parent by requiring first that
there is a substantial change in circumstances, and second, that the
requested custody modification be in the child's best interests.93
94 stated that
Moreover, the North Dakota court, in Barstad v. Barstad,
"[t]he maintenance of custodial stability and continuity 'is a very
compelling consideration' in determining custody and merits the
protection of the existing custodial relationship.95 In denying the
noncustodial father's petition to transfer custody, the court held that
neither the trial court's decision that the move would significantly affect
visitation nor the child's preference to live with his noncustodial father
constituted a substantial change in circumstances per se.96
Vermont courts also protect the custodial parent's right to relocate
by directly allocating the burden of proof to the noncustodial parent and
making it difficult to challenge a relocation. Similar to the language of

88. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-22(d) (West 1979) for the statutory language prior to the
amended language detailed infra note 89 and accompanying text.
89. Id. The Indiana Code has been subsequently changed and presently applies to "a substantial
change in one (1) or more of the factors which the court may consider .... IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-1-11.5-22(d) (West Supp. 1996).

90. Swonder, 642 N.E.2d at 1380 (citation omitted).
91. See id.at 1381.
92. Id. at 1383 (quoting Walker v. Chatfield, 553 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)).

93. See Barstad v. Barstad, 499 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1993).
94. 499 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1993).

95. Id. at 587 (quoting Delzer v. Winn, 491 N.W.2d 741, 744 (N.D. 1992)).
96. See id. at 588; see also Klose v. Klose, 524 N.W.2d 94, 96-97 (N.D. 1994) (denying a
petition to transfer custody even though both children expressed a desire to remain behind to live
with the noncustodial parent).
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the Indiana statute,.7 the Vermont court, in Lane v. Schenck,98 required
the noncustodial parent to show that the child's best interests "would be
so undermined by a relocation... that a transfer of custody [would be]
necessary."" The Vermont statute requires a showing that there is a
"real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances" in addition
to showing that the move is in the child's best interests.' °
In Lane, the custodial mother appealed a family court decision that
required her to choose between attending law school in Iowa and
retaining custody of her children.'' The mother, believing custody to
be of paramount importance, gave up her chance to attend law school
rather than give up custody. 2 The Lane court reversed and remanded
the case because the lower court erroneously failed to determine whether
the change in circumstances would make a change in custody necessary." The court noted that forcing a custodial parent to choose
between a child and a chance for a new life was an improper means of
coercing the parent into remaining within the jurisdiction."
At first glance, the allocation of the burden of proof in Tennessee
seems to treat the custodial and noncustodial parent equally. Depending
upon whether or not there is a relocation restriction in the original
custody agreement, the Tennessee court will either directly or indirectly
allocate the burden of proof. In the absence of a relocation restriction, the
burden falls directly on the noncustodial parent.' 5 Where there is a
restriction, the burden falls on the custodial parent to show that the move
is in the child's best interests. 6 However, if the custodial parent makes
"a prima facie showing of a sincere, good-faith reason for the move and
a prima facie showing that the move is consistent with the child's best
07
interest" the burden will shift back to the noncustodial parent.
The Tennessee court's aggressive approach in protecting the
custodial parent's right to relocate is evidenced not only by this burden

97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
98. 614 A.2d 786 (Vt. 1992).

99. Id. at 792
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 668 (1989).
See Lane, 614 A.2d at 787.
See id. at 787-88.
See id. at 792.
See id.; see also Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 3, at 276 (noting that courts often

present a "Sophie's choice" to custodial mothers, forcing them to choose between their new husband
and custody of their children).
105. See Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993).
106. See id.
107. Id.
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shifting, but also by the fact that Tennessee courts have recently
abandoned the best interests of the child standard in favor of an outright
presumption. Initially, the Tennessee court favored the custodial parent
by applying the best interests of the child standard in order to preserve
some element of family autonomy and ease the resolution of custody
disputes. Recently, in Aaby v. Strange,' while still favoring the
custodial parent, the court rejected the "best interests of the child" test
for relocation cases because such a vague standard made those goals
"difficult or impossible to achieve. '""es
Analogous to the trickle down approach of determining the best
interests of the child,"0 the court recognized that a standard that looked
solely to the best interests of the child was inapplicable because the
child's interests are naturally interwoven with the interests of the
parent."' Under this newly adopted presumption, a Tennessee custodial
parent is allowed to remove the child unless the noncustodial parent
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motive behind
the move is to deter visitation."2 The court's holding was consistent
with other jurisdictions that directly allocate the burden of proof, such as
Indiana, North Dakota and Vermont,"' in that the noncustodial parent
can oppose the move by showing that the move is a material change in
circumstances that would harm the child. However, the Tennessee court
took this approach one step further by recognizing that an investigation
into a material change in circumstances is separate from a removal
proceeding."'
Allocating the burden of proof to favor the custodial parent, though
effective, creates problems that do not exist in jurisdictions that favor the
custodial parent through a presumption. As evidenced by states such as
Florida and New Jersey, indirect allocation of the burden of proof can
create confusion and require the court to clarify their policy or to
continuously define their tests."' In addition, switching the burden from
the custodial parent to the noncustodial parent masks what the courts are
really attempting to accomplish-permitting the custodial parent to
relocate. From a practical standpoint, a presumption in favor of the
108. 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996).

109. Id. at 629.
110. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.

111. See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 629.
112. See id.

113. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
114. See Aaby, 924 S.,V.2d at 630.
115. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
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custodial parent's right to relocate would be a more direct way of

accomplishing this goal.1'6
B. JurisdictionsFavoringthe NoncustodialParent
While the trend in relocation law is to favor the custodial parent,
some states remain adamant in protecting the noncustodial parent's right
to continuing visitation. Like those states that favor the custodial parent,
pro-noncustodial jurisdictions give effect to their policy by means of
either a presumption or an allocation of the burden of proof that weighs
heavily against the disfavored parent.
1. Presumptions Against Relocation
Jurisdictions that favor the noncustodial parent through an outright
presumption are few in number. Those that do often direct their focus to
collateral issues while avoiding a determination of whether the child
could benefit from the move. For example, the South Carolina Supreme
Court, in McAlister v. Patterson,"7 focused on the child's relationship
with his extended family. There, the custodial mother wished to relocate
to Washington D.C. with her son and her new husband." 8 The court
stated that "[a]s a rule, the presumption is against removal of the
child.""' 9 The court placed significant emphasis on the trial court's
holding that removal of the child would be detrimental not only to the
child's relationship with his noncustodial father, but also with his
grandparents, his great-grandparents, and even his great aunt.'20 The
court placed greater significance on the child's relationship with his
extended family than it did on his relationship with his custodial parent.
Similarly, in Maine, courts wrongly place emphasis on maintaining
the child's environmental continuity rather than on the child's need for
custodial continuity. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,
in Rowland v. Kingman, 2' stated that the child would benefit from "the
continuity of locale, routine, community, and schooling."'"
Prior to the dissolution of their marriage, the Rowland parents lived

116. This argument also applies to jurisdictions that directly allocate the burden onto the
noncustodial parent.
117. 299 S.E.2d 322 (S.C. 1982).
118. See id.at 322.
119. Id. at 323.
120. See id.
121. 629 A.2d 613 (Me. 1993).
122. Id. at 616.
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in Yarmouth, Maine." After the dissolution, the noncustodial father
moved to Winslow while the custodial mother remained in
Yarmouth.'24 In addition to denying the custodial mother's relocation
to Oregon, the court decided that if the custodial mother did move, the
noncustodial parent could gain residential custody only if he moved back
to Yarmouth."z In essence, the court placed greater importance on the
children remaining in Yarmouth and the continuity of location than it did
on which parent would be the custodial parent. The dissent sharply
criticized the court for placing "undue emphasis on the current residence
of the children by requiring that their primary residence be in the Town
of Yarmouth, a location where neither parent ha[d] a reason to reside .
,,126
Similar to jurisdictions that recognize a presumption in favor of the
custodial parent, some anti-removal jurisdictions interpret custody statutes
so as to create pro-noncustodial parent presumptions. In Rowland, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine used a statute, which labeled relocation
a "substantial change in circumstances," 27 in order to force the custodial parent to choose between moving to Oregon to be with her new
husband or remaining in Maine with her children.'28 By raising relocation to the level of a "substantial change," the Maine court justified a
transfer of custody upon the custodial parent's decision to relocate.
However, the Rowland decision left many questions unanswered.
For instance, and most important, in the event that neither parent wished
to remain in Yarmouth, would the court have allowed the move?'29
Moreover, the Rowland decision neglected to consider the growth of the
custodial family since the divorce. Although neither the custodial nor the
noncustodial parent wished to live in Yarmouth, the parent wishing to
gain or keep custody was forced to live there. The court failed to imagine
the children receiving equal "routine, community, and schooling" in
either Oregon or in the father's new home.
Commentators have questioned the ability of Rowland to guide
future custody determinations. 3 ' The focus on "environmental continu-

123.

See id. at 614.

124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 617 (Clifford & Roberts, JJ., dissenting).

127. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1657 (West Supp. 1996).
128. See Rowland, 629 A.2d at 615.

129. This question was never answered as the father expressed a willingness to move back to
Yarmouth in the event that the children's mother relocated to Oregon. See id. at 616.
130. See Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 3, at 289.
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ity" seems out of place in a time where the trend in relocation law is to
maintain "custodial continuity."13 ' In addition, focusing on stability in
location fails to address either the custodial parent's desire to move or
the noncustodial parent's visitation schedule. Like the South Carolina
court, the Maine Court emphasized collateral matters and decided a
relocation dispute by avoiding the real relocation dilemma.
In contrast, a presumption in favor of the move would focus on the
motives behind the move. In addition, a presumption favoring the
custodial parent would result in a more equitable treatment of both
parties by recognizing the custodial parent's right to relocate and at the
same time providing the noncustodial parent with the option to petition
for a change in custody if the move would harm the child. In sum, a
presumption favoring relocation would address the "real" issues and not
divert attention to collateral ones.
2. Burdens of Proof Disfavoring Relocation
Similar to jurisdictions that favor the custodial parent, anti-removal
jurisdictions allocate the burden of proof either directly or indirectly to
favor the noncustodial parent. Injurisdictions that attempt to resolve
relocation disputes by reexamining custody, courts will often require the
challenging parent to show that there is a change in circumstances
justifying a modification. Although this requirement seems to place the
burden on the noncustodial parent, the burden is actually indirectly
placed on the custodial parent as anti-removal courts are quick to
conclude that the petition to relocate itself qualifies as a sufficient change
in circumstances.
For example, the Maryland courts indirectly place the burden of
proof on the custodial parent. Rather than follow the current trend (or its
own precedent, for that matter) in favoring the relocating parent, the
Maryland court, in Domingues v. Johnson,' held that "it is not
necessary that a parent be declared unfit" before custody can be
changed.' Moreover, the court eased the noncustodial parent's burden
by stating that "changes brought about by the relocation of a parent may,
in a given case, be sufficient to justify a change in custody."'3 The
Maryland court, by declaring relocation a sufficient justification for
changing custody, forces the custodial parent wishing to relocate into a
131. Id.
132. 593 A.2d 1133 (Md. 1991).
133. Id. at 1140.
134. Id.
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35
full blown redetermination of custody.
Prior to Domingues, the burden was on the noncustodial parent to
show that the move would result in harm to the child. 136 Now, however,
the burden falls on the custodial parent to show that the move is in the
child's best interests.' 7 In short, by allocating the burden of proof,
Maryland favors the noncustodial parent.'33
Like Maryland, the Virginia Court of Appeals also helps the
noncustodial parent meet their burden by deeming relocation to be a
change in circumstances sufficient to reevaluate custody. In Hughes v.
Gentry,'39 the court initially stated that the burden was on the noncustodial parent challenging the move to show a change in circumstances
since the last custody award.'" However, the court then went on to say
that "the relocation of the custodial parent ... constitutes a material
change of circumstances"' 4 ' sufficient to justify a change in custody
from the custodial mother to the noncustodial father. 42 Therefore, the
actual burden of proof fell on the custodial parent to show that the
change of circumstances would be in the child's best interests.'43
The Illinois courts have provided relocation law with a good
example of what not to do in determining a removal dispute. In
accordance with Illinois statutory law,'" the Illinois Supreme Court
determined state policy and procedure for relocation disputes in In re
Marriage of Eckert.'4 However, since that decision, Illinois courts have
failed to consistently interpret the Illinois Supreme Court's holding. The

135. Additionally, the true weight of the burden of proof falls on the custodial parent because,
like the Maine court in Rowland, Maryland courts place a heavy emphasis on environmental stability.
See id. at 1141 (stating that although continuity in the custodial parent relationship is important,
stability can also be found in allowing the children to remain in their current location).
136. See Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 598 A.2d 482, 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
137. See Domingues, 593 A.2d at 1139.
138. See Bowermaster, supra note 4, at 818. Although the Maryland court believes the best
interests of the child approach to be neutral, the focus on environmental stability, the increase of the
burden on the custodial parent, and the classification of relocation as a substantial change in
circumstances justifying a change in custody all reveal that the Maryland approach truly favors the

noncustodial parent. See id.
139. 443 S.E.2d 448 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
140. See id. at 451.
141. Id.
142. See id.at 452.
143. See id.at 452-53.
144. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN. 5/609 (west 1993).
145. 518 N.E.2d 1041 (111.1988). The court stated that "'the burden of proving that such
removal is in the best interests of such child ...is on the party seeking the removal."' Id. at 1045
(quoting 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609).
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result leaves Illinois parents with conflicting case law by which to predict
judicial reaction to a proposed relocation-arguably leaving Illinois
parents in a worse position then if there were no relocation standard at
all.
In Eckert, the court adopted a pro-noncustodial parent position by
seeking to prevent the lower courts from "dilut[ing] the burden of proof
which the legislature has placed on the custodial parent."'" The court
held that while the primary consideration is always the best interests of
the child, the court should be guided by the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act 47 which seeks to "secure the maximum
involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical,
mental, moral and emotional well-being of the children during and after
the litigation."'" The noncustodial parent was found, by expert opinion,
to have had a very involved and "'excellent relationship"' with his
son.' 49 The court emphasized the noncustodial parent's right to visitation, noting that a court should be "'loathe to interfere"' with a visitation
schedule where the noncustodial parent "assiduously exercised his or her
visitation rights."' 50
Although the Eckert opinion seems to clearly establish the court's
pro-noncustodial policy, the lower courts have interpreted the decision
inconsistently. Within the same year, the Illinois Appellate Court decided
In re Marriage of Zamarripa-Gesundheit," citing the Illinois removal
statute, the holding in Eckert, and the three primary focuses of the Eckert
court in determining removal cases) 52 However, the court reached the
opposite result of the Eckert court and allowed the custodial parent to
remove the child.
In Zamarripa-Gesundheit,the custodial mother wished to relocate
to Seattle to be with her new husband.' The noncustodial father was

146. Id.
147. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/101-5/802 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
148. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046 (citing the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act,
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/102 (West Supp. 1997)).
149. Id. at 1043.
150. Id. at 1046 (quoting D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.),
aff'd, 365 A.2d 716 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)).
151. 529 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
152. The three factors for determining relocation are (1) the likelihood of improving the quality
of life of both the parent and the child, (2) the motive of the custodial parent for moving and the
motive of the noncustodial parent for challenging the move, and (3) the visitation rights of the
noncustodial parent, including the opportunity to establish a realistic and reasonable visitation
schedule. See id. at 782.
153. See id. at 780.
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very involved in his daughter's life, much like the noncustodial father in
Eckert. However, the court held that although the move would affect the
father's visitation, 54 the interests of the custodial parent should not be
subordinated to the interests of the noncustodial parent.155 Consistent
with states following a trickle down philosophy of the best interests of
the child,'56 the court concluded that since the mother's new husband
wanted to live in Seattle, and the mother wanted to live with her new
husband, the child would be happier if the removal were allowed because
the new couple, and consequently, the family would be happier.'57
In contrast to the holding in Zamarrippa-Gesundheit,the Appellate
Court, in In re Marriage ofBerk,'58 denied a custodial mother's request
to remove the child to Canada. The custodial mother argued that the
quality of her life and, therefore, her children's lives would improve if
she were allowed to move to be with her new husband. 9 Although the
potential for improving the child's quality of life through improving the
custodial parent's happiness was a controlling reason for allowing the
relocation in Zamarripa-Gesundheit, it was rejected by the Berk
6
court. 0

The Berk court stated that if the happiness of the parent being able
to join her new spouse was sufficient to show best interests, then there
would be no need to adjudicate removal cases, and the court's authority
to decide relocation would become merely "ceremonial."' 6 In short, the
Berk court gave previous removal cases little, if any, precedential
value. 62
Once again it seemed as though the Illinois Appellate Court worked
out its policy towards relocation when it decided In re Marriage of

154. The court accepted the custodial mother's proposal of summer and vacation visitation, in

addition to weekly phone calls at the mother's expense, as "adequate means to foster his
relationship" with the child. Id. at 783.

155. See id.
156. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.

157. See Zamamipa-Gesundheft,529 N.E.2d at 783.
158. 574 N.E.2d 1364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). In Berk, however, there would have been a great
financial benefit in allowing the move, whereas in Zamaiipa-Gesundheit,the move was lateral. In
Canada, the custodial mother's new husband was earning the equivalent of $86,800 American, and
the mother would increase her salary from $24,000 American to $26,000 Canadian. In addition, the

children would have moved into a five-bedroom home within walking distance from their schools.
See id. at 1366.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1369.
161. See id.
162. See id. (holding that each removal situation must be determined on a case-by-case basis
without the influence of prior removal decisions).
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Eaton.63 There the court stated that the link between the custodial

parent's best interests and the child's best interests was not always
sufficient to warrant a granting of relocation.'" Consistent with Berk,
the relationship between the parent's quality of life and the child's
interests was only one factor to be considered.

Recently, however, the Illinois Appellate Court again changed its
focus in deciding removal cases. In In re Parentage of R.M.F,65 the
court allowed the custodial mother to remove her minor child to Arizona,

heavily emphasizing that "there is a connection, albeit indirect, between
the custodial parent's quality of life and the child's quality of life."'66

The court extracted examples from a previous relocation case, demonstrating how the child's quality of life would improve through the

custodial parent's improved quality of life.'67 This approach, again,
tipped the scale in favor of the move.

The confusion existing in the Illinois appellate courts presents what
is potentially one of the worst situations for a couple seeking to resolve
a relocation dispute. While a presumption or a burden of proof may
present difficult challenges for the disfavored parent, there is still some
security to be found in knowing how the court will address the situation.
Litigating a removal within the Illinois courts, on the other hand, is akin
to "rolling the dice."'68

Unfortunately, however, the inability of the Illinois Appellate Court
to reach a consensus about how to approach relocation cases is not
unique. When the three-tier relocation test was the standard in New
York,'69 the lower courts often disagreed on the interpretation and

application of the various stages of the test. This confusion was not
163. 646 N.E.2d 635 (IIl. App. Ct. 1995).
164. See id.at 642 ("When a move would improve the quality ofthe custodial parent's life, we
conclude the trial judge must consider the benefits to be realized by the child ... from such
enhancement of the custodial parent's circumstances").
165. 655 N.E.2d 1137 (11l.App. Ct. 1995).
166. Id. at 1141.
167. See In re Marriage of Pfeiffer, 604 N.E.2d 1069 (111.
App. Ct. 1992) (noting that a higher
paying job, better schools, and better opportunities in general could all be used as evidence that the
child's quality of life would improve in the new location).
168. The phrase appropriately sums up the frightening randomness by which various
jurisdictions approach relocation law. See Cohen, supra note 34, at 131.
169. Some commentators consider the New York approach to be a two-level examination. See,
e.g., Sondra Miller, Whatever Happenedto the "Best Interests" Analysis in New York Relocation
Cases?, 15 PACE L. REV. 339, 343-48 (1995). In this Note, the New York approach will be regarded
as a three-tier test as case law clearly distinguishes between level one, implications on visitation, and
level two, exceptional circumstances, in that it is possible to affect the noncustodial parent's
visitation without evoking the second tier of the test.
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alleviated by changing to the best interests of the child standard. 7 ' The
relocation laws in Illinois and New York evidence the confusion that
results from ambiguous, amorphous, and vague relocation standards.
1m1. NEW YORK RELOCATION LAW
A.

Pre-Tropea Case Law

Prior to the adoption of the amorphous "best interests of the child"
standard, New York's three-tier test' was regarded as one of the most
anti-removal standards in relocation law. 72 Under the first tier, the

burden of proof was on the noncustodial parent to show that relocation
would result in the denial of regular and meaningful access to the child.
Meaningful access has been defined as the "ability of a noncustodial

parent to continue to maintain a close and meaningful relationship with
his or her children."'7

Second, upon showing that the move impaired visitation, courts
recognized a presumption that the move was not in the best interests of

the child.

A custodial parent could rebut the presumption by showing

170. See infra Part IV.
171. Although the test for relocation is stated in numerous cases, it is generally credited to two
court of appeals cases, see Daghir v. Daghir, 439 N.E.2d 324 (N.Y. 1982); Weiss v. Weiss, 418
N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1981), as well as a second department appellate decision, see Strahl v. Strahl, 414
N.Y.S.2d 184 (App. Div. 1979), affd, 407 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1980).
172. See Bowermaster, supra note 4, at 804; see also Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 3, at
297 ("After more than a decade as the jurisdiction with the standard harshest to custodial parents,
New York has moved to a stance significantly more supportive of the custodial parent... ).
Historically, courts were reluctant to allow a custodial parent to relocate with a child because
the courts feared losing control over custody and visitation disputes. Passage of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988 & Supp. 1997), and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994), has largely eliminated this concern by
specifically reserving jurisdiction to the state which decided the original custody dispute. The result
has been the elimination of forum shopping by custodial parents seeking more permissive relocation
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the number of litigated relocation disputes is increasing rather than
decreasing. See Roger M. Baron, Refining RelocationLaws-The Next Step in Attacking the Problem
ofParentalKidnapping,25 TEX. L. REV. 119, 119 n.3 (1993) (stating that the passage of these two
acts helped to eliminate state "havens" for noncustodial parents).
173. Bennett v. Bennett, 617 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (App. Div. 1994). For another definition of
meaningful access, see Radford v. Propper,597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972 (App. Div. 1993). That court
stated that a noncustodial parent has the right to enjoy "frequent, regular and meaningful contact
with his or her children." Id.
174. See, e.g., MacCue v. Chartier, 617 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545-46 (App. Div. 1994). The courts
justified the presumption by reasoning that a child's best interests were served by "his being nurtured
and guided by both of his natural parents." Schwartz v. Schwartz, 456 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 (App. Div.
1982) (citing Daghir v. Daghir, 439 N.E.2d 324 (N.Y. 1982)).
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justified an infringement on visitation

76

Deciding what constituted "exceptional circumstances"
rights.
generated a wealth of case law but no clear definition. There were,
however, some factors which, if present, seemed to make approval of the
move a bit more likely. For example, courts often deemed "economic
necessity" sufficient to justify the infringement on visitation rights.'
In addition, the courts found exceptional circumstances where the move
was involuntary,
such as when it was caused by a new spouse's job
78
transfer.
Economic necessity is not an easy factor to prove as the term has
been narrowly tailored. Courts have distinguished economic necessity
from mere economic benefit. To meet the requisite level of exceptional
circumstances, the economic benefit must be truly necessary, as opposed
to the relocating parent's desire or mere opportunity for economic
betterment.179 Where the custodial parent seeks to simply start fresh in

175. The "exceptional circumstances" requirement has also been stated as a requirement of
"exceptional circumstances or pressing concerns." Stec v. Levindofske, 550 N.Y.S.2d 966,967 (App.
Div. 1990); Barie v. Faulkner, 497 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (App. Div. 1985).
176. The exceptional circumstances language, which is often cited in relocation cases, was used
in Weiss, 418 N.E.2d at 380, in a pre-removal context. The Weiss court stated:
[I]n initially prescribing or approving custodial arrangements, absent exceptional
circumstances, such as those in which it would be inimical to the welfare of the child or
where a parent in some manner has forfeited his or her right to such access, appropriate
provision for visitation or other access by the noncustodial parent follows almost as a
matter of course.
Id. (citation omitted). The subsequent appellate court interpretation of this language transformed the
Weiss language into the relocation test.
177. See, e.g., Amato v. Amato, 609 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52-53 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that lower
rent, additional child care, health insurance, and full-time employment were exceptional
circumstances meriting a disturbance of the noncustodial parent's right to visitation); Reyes v. Ball,
557 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 1990) (finding exceptional circumstances where the custodial mother's
new husband had a tenured job and the father had proven delinquent with child support payments);
Klein v. Klein, 460 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (App. Div. 1983) (finding exceptional circumstances where
the custodial mother would live rent free and benefit from the willingness of both family and friends
to ease the burden of day care expenses and assist in the care of the child); see also Shed v. Sofia,
521 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 (App. Div. 1987), ajJ'd,521 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1988) (Pine & Balio, JJ.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority found exceptional circumstances where the custodial mother's
new husband could earn a large salary if the family moved).
178. See Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 530 N.Y.S.2d 350, 350 (App. Div. 1988); see also Church v.
Church-Corbett, 625 N.Y.S.2d 367 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that where the custodial mother's new
husband, a Naval officer, was involuntarily assigned to Italy for a period of three years, there were
exceptional circumstances to justify the move).
179. See Ellor v. Ellor, 535 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (App. Div. 1988) (holding that there was not
an argument for economic necessity where the custodial mother did not work or seek out
employment in the new location); see also Powers v. Powers, 608 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343 (App. Div.
1994) (noting that a limited financial benefit was insufficient to warrant a removal).
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a new location, to "better" her economic condition, the request for
relocation has been denied. 180
Economic necessity arising out of the possibility of improving the
custodial family's income, such as where the custodial parent or a new
spouse receives a promotion, has met some opposition in the appellate
courts. Courts have denied relocation where the custodial parent failed
to exhaust all local job opportunities 8' and where the acceptance of a
new job or promotion was optional.'82
In addition to economic necessity, domestic violence'83 and an
adverse effect on the child's psychological health"' have also been held
sufficient to meet the requisite level of exceptional circumstances
necessary to alter the current noncustodial parent's visitation schedule.
However, because courts are generally unwilling to subordinate the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights to the needs of a new spouse,
remarriage, absent a showing of economic necessity, is generally
insufficient to meet exceptional circumstances. 5
The third and final tier of the New York standard was the catchall
test of whether the move was in the best interests of the child. 86 It is
this "catch-all" tier that provided the noncustodial parent with the
greatest protection against removal. Because of the vague nature of the
best interests standard, the courts were free to interpret "best interests"

180. See Sanders v. Sanders, 585 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (App. Div. 1992); see also Bonfiglio v.
Bonfiglio, 521 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1987).
181. See Raybin v. Raybin, 613 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728 (App. Div. 1994) (requiring proof of a
second job search where custodian failed to obtain a job eight months earlier); Ferguson v. Ressico,
510 N.Y.S.2d 275,277 (App. Div. 1986); see also Stroh v. Hubbard, 519 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div.
1987) (denying a custodial father's request to relocate to Nevada after he testified that he no longer
was able to advance at his current job and that he could obtain employment at a higher salary in
Nevada). Courts have also denied the move for lack of exceptional circumstances where the custodial
parent's new spouse accepted a job or promotion in a new jurisdiction prior to exhausting job
opportunities in the current area of residence. See Wiles v. Wiles, 578 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (App. Div.
1991); Pasco v. Nolen, 546 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (App. Div. 1989).
182. See Towne v. Towne, 546 N.Y.S.2d 213, 214 (App. Div. 1989); Kozak v. Kozak, 490
N.Y.S.2d 583 (App. Div. 1985).
183. See Sheridan v. Sheridan, 611 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (App. Div. 1994); Desmond v. Desmond,
509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
184. See Savino v. Savino, 487 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1985).
185. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953,955 (App. Div. 1993); Hemphill v. Hemphill,
572 N.Y.S.2d 689, 693 (App. Div. 1991); Kelly v. Kelly, 518 N.Y.S.2d 508,509 (App. Div. 1987);
see also Richardson v. Howard, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that a custodial
mother could not remove her children from New York where her sole reason for moving was to
marry her fianc6 and move into his home, even though they were willing to return to New York in
one year).
186. Since Tropea was decided, it is this third tier that is all that remains of the three-tier test.
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as they wished. Unfortunately for the custodial parent, this often meant
keeping the custodial parent chained to the jurisdiction that initially
governed the custody order.
Although New York law traditionally favored the noncustodial
parent, several courts have attempted to chip away at the pro-noncustodial three-tier test. The Appellate Division, Third Department made one of
the first attempts to abandon the three-tier standard. The court adopted
a "nearby move" test whereby if the custodial parent's new location was
not at least a certain threshold distance from the noncustodial parent, the
court would not evoke the standard's second tier, a showing of exceptional circumstances.187 Likewise, the Fourth Department abandoned the
three-tier test in Ideman v. Ideman."8 There the court awarded custody
to the noncustodial father because the mother, in an unauthorized move,
relocated their child.'89 The court did not mention, nor did it cite to the
three-tier test, and instead stated that "[t]he court may not make an initial
determination of permanent custody without conducting a factual hearing
to determine the fundamental issue of the best interests of the child."' 90
In Hemphill v. Hemphill,9' the Second Department attempted to
remove one of the foundation blocks from New York relocation law by
abandoning the presumption that a move which interfered with visitation
was not in the best interests of the child.'92 Instead of a presumption,
the court promulgated a balancing test between the rights and problems
of the child with the rights and problems of the parents. 93 Despite the
decision in Hemphill, subsequent case law relapsed back into the threetier approach to relocation law94 until Tropea was decided in 1996.

187. See Niemiec v. Hunsberger, 610 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (App. Div. 1994) (120 miles); Lake
v. Lake, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (App. Div. 1993) (120 miles); Schaefer v. Brennan, 566 N.Y.S.2d
705,707 (App. Div. 1991) (60 miles); Murphy v. Murphy, 535 N.Y.S.2d 844,846 (App. Div. 1988)

(340 miles). But see Bennett v. Bennett, 617 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that a
180-mile move would disrupt noncustodial access and required a showing of exceptional

circumstances).
188. 565 N.Y.S.2d 352 (App. Div. 1990).
189. See id. at 353.
190. Id.; see also Wodka v. Wodka, 565 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that the
unauthorized removal of a child was one factor to be considered in a best interests hearing to
determine a change of custody).
191. 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (App. Div. 1991).
192. See id. at 693-94 ("There is no basis for a per se rule, i.e., that inasmuch as relocation
involves separation from a noncustodial parent which is, of itself, not in the child's best interest,
relocation should be denied as a matter of law.").
193. See i.
194. See Bostinto v. Bostinto, 616 N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Div. 1994); Amato v. Amato, 609
N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div. 1994); Radford v. Propper, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967 (App. Div. 1993).
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B.

The Tropea Decision

In the face of the New York courts' confusion in defining the
applicable relocation standard, in 1996, the highest New York court
restructured the state's approach to relocation in Tropea v. Tropea'95
In an attempt to fix what was wrong with the three-tier test, the court
decided two difficult companion cases and affirmed appellate court
decisions allowing the custodial parents to relocate with their children.
In Tropea, the custodial mother of two children sought permission
to relocate from Onondaga County to Schenectady, New York.'96 The
mother planned to move into a home she purchased with her intended
husband whose architecture business was located in Schenectady. 97 In
addition to the two children from her prior marriage to the noncustodial
father, the custodial mother and her new husband were expecting a child
of their own.' In their divorce decree, the Tropea parents agreed not
to relocate outside Onondaga County without court approval.'99 Based
upon this agreement, the noncustodial father sought a change of custody,
claiming that the decision to move to Schenectady was merely the
mother's choice of a different lifestyle and would essentially punish him
by denying him frequent and continuous contact with his children." 0
The noncustodial father presented evidence that he was an active
participant in the lives of the two children, and that he was an active
participant in the lives of his children.20'
Initially, the lower court denied the move and dismissed the petition
for removal.0 2 However, on appeal, the intermediate appellate court
reversed the Judicial Hearing Officer's decision and allowed the
move.0 3 The appellate court held that the custodial mother established
that the move would not infringe upon the noncustodial parent's right to
meaningful access with his children.2" Moreover, the liberal visitation
schedule proposed by the custodial parent and her willingness to ensure

195. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).

196. See id. at 146.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Tropea v. Tropea, 624 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1011 (App. Div. 1995), affd, 665 N.E.2d 145

(N.Y. 1996).
200. See Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 146.

201.
202.
203.
204.

See id. at 147.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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the maintenance of regular and frequent contact with the noncustodial
father enabled the court to conclude that the move was in the best
interests of the children." 5
In Browner v. Kenward,2 6 the companion case to lRopea, the
parents agreed that the custodial mother would need permission to move
more than thirty-five miles away from the noncustodial father.27 The
custodial mother sought permission to relocate with her son from White
Plains, New York, to Pittsfield, Massachusetts, a distance of 130
miles. 28 The mother presented evidence that although she searched in
New York, she could not find a job or suitable housing. 2°9 In Massachusetts, she located an affordable home and a good job and would also
have the benefit of being close to her parents, to whom her son had
become quite attached.210
The court allowed the move even though the move to New England
would interfere with the visitation rights of the noncustodial father, who
had been "vigilant" in maintaining his relationship with his son, and even
though the family court found the mother's argument "to be less than
convincing."211 The family court held that the 130-mile move, although
greatly increasing the distance between the noncustodial parent and the
child, 2"would not deprive respondent of meaningful contact with his
21
son."
In its analysis of prior case law, the court of appeals in Tropea
began by noting that relocation cases involve a balancing between the
interests of the custodial parent in moving, the interests of the noncustodial parent in maintaining a relationship with her child, and the interests
of the child.2 3 After describing the current relocation standard, a
product of the appellate court's interpretation of Weiss v. Weiss 4 and
Daghir v. Dagir,2 s as "problematic" and "unsatisfactory," the court

205. See id.
206.

623 N.Y.S.2d 325 (App. Div. 1995), aff'd, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). The New York

Court of Appeal's decision provides a more detailed explanation of the Browner facts.
207. See Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 147. Because the court of appeals combined the analysis of the
Tropea and Browner cases in one decision, the court's reasoning will be referred to as the Tropea
decision.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. 418 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1981).
215. 439 N.E.2d 324 (N.Y. 1982).
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went on to note that a three-tier test is difficult to apply and "erects
barriers to the courts' consideration of all of the relevant facartificial
21 6
tors.

In abandoning the previous three-tier test, the court stated that
relocation cases "are simply too complex to be satisfactorily handled
within any mechanical, tiered analysis that prevents or interferes with a
simultaneous weighing and comparative analysis of all of the relevant
facts and circumstances. 2 17 The court then adopted the best interests
of the child standard as a means of deciding relocation cases on a caseby-case basis. 218 In short, the court condensed the previous standard
into the catchall third tier to allow greater judicial discretion, stating that
"no single factor should be treated as dispositive or given such disproportionate weight as to predetermine the outcome."1 9
The court rejected what was one of the most restrictive standards in
relocation law in order to embrace a more permissive approach.
Arguments that were insufficient to justify interference with the
noncustodial parent's visitation under the previous three-tier test, such as
remarriage, wanting to make a fresh start and hoping for economic
betterment-may now be valid motives if the move would ultimately be
in the best interests of the child."c In addition, the court stated that the
noncustodial parent's ability to relocate should be considered along with
the custodial parent's desire to move." The court provided little
guidance with respect to what factors would be considered in determining
the best interests of the child. The court included motives, quality of life,
right to visitation, economic benefit, educational benefit, and the overall
preservation of the parent-child relationship, but left the list open to
include other factors at the judge's discretion.2
The Tropea decision broke fourteen years of silence from the New
York Court of Appeals. However, while the three-tier test may have been
problematic and unsatisfactory, the best interests standard fails to solve
any of the previous problems. Indeed, the best interests of the child
standard actually creates additional ones.

216. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 149-50 (including factors such as motives and the positive or
negative impact that the change would have on the child).
217. Id. at 150.

218. See id.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 150-51.

221. See id.
at 151.
222. See id.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
STANDARD IN RELOCATION CASES

Most commentators agree that there were problems under the
three-tier test.' For one, it favored the noncustodial parent through
both a presumption and a heavy burden of proof on the custodial parent.
However, Tropea does not fix these problems. Besides making it very
difficult for the custodial parent to relocate, the Tropea court failed to
provide desperately needed guidance to parents and litigators seeking to
resolve relocation disputes.
A.

Litigation Problems

While the best interests of the child standard is generally used in
custody determinations, it is inappropriate for relocation cases. For the
purposes of determining where, and with whom, the child should reside,
the best interests standard is too vague to provide a useful guideline.2 4
The change to the best interests standard fails to resolve litigation
problems that existed under the previous three-tier test, including the lack
of definitions, the rising number of cases, and the increasing complexity
of relocation disputes in general.
Prior to Tropea, the appellate courts struggled to define the various
levels of the three-tier test. Specifically, defining "meaningful access"
and "exceptional circumstances" generated a wealth of case law, but no
uniform definition.' Meaningful access has been defined as the
"ability of a noncustodial parent to continue to maintain a close and
meaningful relationship with his or her children." 6 It has also been
defined as "frequent and regular" access. Under the first definition,
the noncustodial parent and child need not be physically close to one
another. In contrast, under the second definition, the parent and child
need to be physically close to maintain frequency of contact. Exceptional
circumstances could include economic necessity, remarriage, a new job,

223. See, e.g., Merril Sobie, What Ever Happenedto the "BestInterests" Analysis in New York
Relocation Cases?A Response, 15 PACE L. Rnv. 685, 686 (supporting the exceptional circumstances
test, although admitting that the test creates some inconsistent results and is not perfect).
224. See id. at 687; see also Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434,437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating
that the best interests standard "must be given more specific and instructive content to address, in
particular, 'relocation' disputes").
225. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
226. Bennett v. Bennett, 617 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (App. Div. 1994).
227. Radford v. Propper, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972 (App. Div. 1993).
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or any number of other factors depending upon the judge's frame of
mind.' In addition, factors which may have been considered significant in one case could be easily dismissed in another court under the
guise of needing case-by-case analysis. The result was a standard that
provided families and litigators with little insight and even less security
in seeking the resolution of a relocation petition.
Some commentators question whether it is possible to define the
best interests of the child. 9 Today, although every jurisdiction, at least
as a matter of policy, if not expressly, decides custody disputes according
to the best interests of the child standard;"o the definition can change
from state to state, court to court, and even from judge to judge.
Different courts ask different questions, which may include, who is the
primary caretaker?, what is the chance of a reasonable visitation
schedule?, and where would the child prefer to live?. In the past, courts
have relied on at least thirty-two different factors to determine best
interests."sI In the light of the appellate court's inability to agree on
definitions encompassed in the three-tier test, including the overall lack
of a consensus as to what the "best interests of a child" test entails, there
is no reason to believe that the appellate courts will achieve better
success in hammering out a definition of the "new" best interests of the
child standard. In fact, since the Tropea decision came down, the
appellate courts have been unsuccessful in defining the standard. Courts
have included a variety of factors within the definition of best interests
including the quality of affections shown to the child, 2 parental
fitness,u 3 the stability of the homers intellectual development, 5
moral development, 6 financial status, 7 the wishes of the children,"3 visitation rights, 3 9 overall stability in the child's life,2"

228. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
229. See Barron, supra note 172, at 419 n.38.
230. See Bowermaster, supra note 4, at 794.

231. See LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the "Best Interests of the Child"
Standard, 34 S.D. L. REV. 459, 481 (1989).
232. See De Fazio v. De Fazio, 640 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (App. Div. 1996).
233. See Clark v. Williams, 645 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (App. Div. 1996); De Fazio, 640 N.Y.S.2d

at 706.
234. See Clark, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 161; De Fazio, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 706.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See De Fazio, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Harder v. Yandoh, 644 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (App. Div. 1996).
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quality of the home environment,24' competence of parental guidRecently, in Stearns v
ance, 2 and health related concerns.'
Baxter,' the trial court included the following considerations in the
determination of best interests: the child's extended family relationships,
the custodial mother's job prospects, the child's academic achievement,
emotional and psychological upheaval, expense of travel, and the child's
contact with both parents.'45 Clearly, neither the lower nor the appellate
courts are any closer to understanding best interests than they were to
defining the previous three-tier standard.
The vague nature of the best interests test was one of the primary
reasons that the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the standard in Aaby
v. Strange.' As opposed to clearing up ambiguous terminology, the
best interests standard only complicated the problem and failed to make
the resolution of relocation conflicts easier. The Tennessee court
enumerated two general goals in rethinking its approach to relocation
disputes: first, favoring family autonomy over judicial intervention and
second, easing the complexity of resolving relocation disputes. 47 In
abandoning their use of the best interests test, the court stated that the
standard made the achievement of these goals difficult, if not impossible.'
The standard, as applied in New York, has proven to be equally
vague and amorphous. New York's change to the best interests standard
fails to decrease the number of custody problems litigated because now
parents have a reason to litigate the custody issue right from the
beginning. For example, even if the noncustodial parent concedes that the
best interests of the child are with the other parent, he or she may decide
to litigate the custody issue in the hopes of getting the court to take
judicial notice that it is within the best interests of a particular child to
have frequent contact with the noncustodial parent. Judicial notice could
then be used to prevent the custodial parent from relocating with the
child because trial courts are generally in the best position to determine
the facts of the case, and appellate courts are usually reluctant to interfere

241. See Clark v. Williams, 645 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (App. Div. 1996).

242. See id.
243. See Malandro v. Lido, 645 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (App. Div. 1996).
244. 655 N.Y.S.2d 261, 261 (Fam. Ct. 1997).
245. See id. at 262-63.

246. 924 SV.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996). For a discussion of Tennessee relocation law, see supra
notes 105-14 and accompanying text.

247. See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 629.
248. Seeki.
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with the factual determination of the child's best interests. 249
In situations where the custody of the children was already
determined, either through an agreement between the parties or with the
aid of the court, the best interests standard now gives the noncustodial
parent a reason to re-initiate a full blown custody battle. "[I]n deciding
whether to permit a move by a custodial parent most courts adopt
essentially the same role as a court making an initial custody determination; that is, the court rules in favor of the option that it judges to be 'in
the best interests of the child."'" ° In short, by examining the relocation
problem under the best interests of the child standard, the court is doing
twice the work. The issue of custody was already resolved under the
same standard that the court will apply to relocation. Therefore, the
change to the best interests standard offers the noncustodial parent a
vehicle by which to re-argue an unfavorable custody decision.
Custody is given to a parent and not to a location. Therefore, any
examination other than whether or not the move would cause harm to the
child should not be applicable to a relocation case. The custodial parent
should be able to rely on their award of custody without fearing that their
decision to relocate will result in a reevaluation of her abilities as the
custodial parent.
The relitigation of custody increases the risk of turning what might
have been an amicable custody settlement into a nasty custody battle.
The best interests standard may now deter, as well as undermine, custody
agreements. One commentator noted that, as a practical matter, there are
only two ways in which to win such a custody battle: showing that the
custodial parent is more fit or showing that the noncustodial parent is
less fit."S It is certainly not in the best interests of children to expose
them to repeated litigation of the fitness of their parents. 2
The application of the best interests standard in relocation also
increases the complexity of the litigation. The standard asks the judge to
predict what will be best for a child in the future. This assumes a certain
level of judicial capability in being able to predict the future for a child
he does not know, in a family which is itself just getting started. In

249. See Barbara Ellen Handschu, Revolution in Relocation Law, N.Y. L.., May 17, 1996, at
1.
250. Janet Bulow & Steven G. Gellman, Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child
Relocation Controversies,35 STAN. L. REV.949, 955-56 (1983).
251. See Leonard G. Florescue, The New View ofRelocation ofthe CustodialParent,N.Y. L.J.,

May 13, 1996, at 3, 5.
252. See id. (stating that such a contest "only increases] the acrimony between the divorcing
parents").
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addition, in cases where the custody of the child has already been
determined, the best interests standard for relocation assumes that the
judge deciding the relocation dispute is better equipped to determine the
interests of the child than the parents or the judge who decided the
original order.
In initial custody determinations, the best interests of the child
standard often calls for expert testimony. When the issue changes from
custody to relocation, the judge's ability to determine best interests is still
lacking. Consequently, the standard cries out for the use of psychologists
and psychiatrists to evaluate the families and the situations in order for
the court to intelligently identify what is best for the child. At a time
where the income of the family may already be divided by alimony and
child support, and where the parents now face the expense of supporting
two residences, the increased expenditures are unjustified and contrary
to the best interests of the child. 3
The use of such medical and scientific personnel will add not only
to the cost of the litigation but also to the length of the proceedings.
Often in relocation disputes, the custodial parent has made some initial
contact with the new location. The parent may have found a new house,
leased an apartment, or been offered a new job or promotion. Such
attachments to the new location are often sensitive to time, requiring
parents to act quickly in order to secure their new apartment or house or
to accept their new job. The noncustodial parent gains an advantageous
position in delaying the custodial parent's ability to move by increasing
the complexity of the relocation dispute's resolution. In the event that the
court does allow the move, the noncustodial parent may have already
succeeded in preventing the move by eliminating opportunities that
existed in the new location.
B.

The Burden of Proof

The allocation of the burden of proof in relocation law can often
determine who will ultimately win the case. 4 Courts and legislatures
can silently place the burden of proof on a disfavored party by allocating
a light burden onto the favored party. Theoretically, jurisdictions
following a best interests of the child standard should be neutral.
However, neutrality is the holy grail of relocation law. Neutrality, defined

253. See Handschu, supranote 249, at 4 (noting that the increased time and expense of expert

opinions may not result in any greater insight into the resolution of the child's best interest).
254. See Bowermaster, supra note 4, at 803.
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as looking only to the interests of the child, independent of either parent,
although always sought, is unobtainable in practice. Because the child's
best interests are fundamentally related to the interests of her custodial
parent, it is impossible to consider the interests of the child without a
consideration of the custodial parent's.
In the pre-Tropea cases, the initial burden fell on the noncustodial
parent to show that the move interfered with the parent's visitation
rights. 5 This proved to be a light burden because any move that is far
enough away to instigate a petition, or motion to enjoin it, will more than
likely have a negative effect on the current visitation schedule. Once the
noncustodial parent met this burden, the custodial parent faced the
difficult challenge of rebutting the presumption that the move was against
the best interests of the child. In a system that struggled to define its
standard, the custodial parent often found it difficult to meet the requisite
exceptional circumstances test."
Like the three-tier test, the best interests standard actually favors the
noncustodial parent. Whereas prior to Tropea, a custodial parent seeking
to move faced a difficult burden of showing exceptional circumstances,
now under the best interests standard, a relocating parent may face a full
blown custody battle. This is not to say that gaining initial custody of the
child would not be a major consideration in future custody decisions, 57
but rather, that upon deciding to relocate, the custodial parent faces a full
custody determination for at least the second time. In this regard, the
burden significantly increased from what it was under the three-tier test.
Now the parent faces an investigation into motives, potential for
improving quality of life, infringement on visitation, health related
concerns, economic benefit, educational benefit, and general preservation
of the parent-child relationship, in addition to whatever the particular
judge deciding the case determines to fall within the meaning of best
interests. 8 In sum, the floodgates have been opened by the best
interests standard.
In New York, the courts should issue a presumption in favor of the
custodial parent's right to move; the burden would fall upon the
noncustodial parent to show that either the custodial parent's motive in
moving was not in good faith or that the move would somehow cause
harm to the child. Moreover, the court should allocate the burden of
255. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
257. See Handschu, supra note 249, at 4.

258. See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996).
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proof while keeping in mind that a relocation decision is not a custody
determination. Custody, as per the child's best interests, was already
determined. A change in custody should not be triggered by a decision
that is within the prerogative of the custodial parent. A presumption in
favor of the custodial parent's right to relocate would recognize that,
under some circumstances, a relocation may merit a change in custody,
but only if based upon a showing of harm to the child and not upon the
relocation. 9
V.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals decision in Tropea v. Tropea,260
which abandoned the three-tier exceptional circumstances test in favor of
the best interests of the child test, fails to solve the problems of the old
standard and at the same time creates new ones. The court should adopt
a presumption in favor of the custodial parent's right to move, rebuttable
upon a showing by the noncustodial parent that the move would be
harmful to the child.
Given the inadequacy of judicial determinations as to the best
interests of the child, and given that one of the few guidelines we have
is the fact that continuity and stability in relationships are important for
the child, courts should be restricted in their authority to interfere with
post-divorce family-unit decision-making. Decisions concerning the
welfare of the child should be left to the custodial parent who, by
virtue of his or her relationship with the child, is best-equipped to
determine the child's needs. The custodial parent should be permitted
to decide where he or she and the child will reside, and that decision
should be second-guessed only where it would present a "clear danger
to the child's well-being."26'
A jurisdiction that recognizes a presumption in favor of the right to
relocate will avoid problems with litigation; there will be a reduction of
cases, a simplification of the issues, and an overall confidence in
knowing how the court will approach the problem.
Presumptions in favor of the right to move allocate the burden of

259. For example, the Florida court in Russenbergerv. Russenberger,654 So. 2d 207,214 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995), stated that while it was not a per se rule in favor of relocation, the noncustodial
parent should carry the burden of showing that the move is not in the child's best interests.
260. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
261. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393,399 (Minn. 1983) (quoting Edward Sivin, Note, Residence
Restrictions on CustodialParents:Implicationsfor the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 363
(1981)).
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proof so that both custodial and noncustodial parents are aware of their
burdens. In contrast, the best interests analysis leaves the custodial parent
in the dark as to which factors the court will deem important enough to
permit relocation. Moreover, under other relocation tests, it is often
unclear as to who has the burden to prove these various factors. The
presumption makes it clear that the custodial parent must first show that
there is a good faith motive, and then the noncustodial parent can rebut
this presumption by showing that the move would harm the child.
Finally, a presumption in favor of the right to relocate protects the
various rights of both parents from the chilling effect of unrestrained
judicial discretion. As the Florida court stated in Costa v. Costa,2 62
"[w]ho but the wisest among us, except in the clearest of cases, could
divine what may be in the best interests of the children?" Determining the child's best interests should be left to the party in the best
position to protect it: the custodial parent. This would also protect the
rights of the parent by favoring the custodial parent-child relationship and
eliminating the likelihood of forcing the parent to choose between a
move and custody.
Perhaps it was too great a leap to expect the New York court to
move from a presumption against the custodial parent to a presumption
in her favor. However, the court should now establish a presumption in
favor of the right to relocate in order to manifest New York's commitment to "strengthening and stabilizing the new, post-divorce family
unit ... minimizing the parents' discomfort and maximizing the child's
prospects of a stable, comfortable and happy life."'2"
Ann M. Driscoll"

262. 429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
263. Id. at 1255.
264. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 151.
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